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Abstract
How do monopolistically competitive industries react to shocks within
the framework provided by a New Keynesian macro model? I link macro-
economics and trade theory through a consideration of market dynamics
and use an analytically tractable model of a closed economy with en-
dogenous rm entry to show the implications of market structure for the
transmission of real shocks to aggregate variables and welfare. The sources
of the shock have an important bearing on the results: thus, productivity
shocks have an extensive impact on production, while innovation shocks
have an intensive impact. A more patient population results in a more
varied market, and is able to cushion the e¤ects following an innovation
shock.
JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES: E32, E52
Keywords: extensive margin, innovation, market dynamics, endoge-
nous entry, real shocks.
1 Introduction
Markets are dynamic and as such both the volume and range of goods supplied
change from period to period, these changes being linked to macroeconomic
foundations. Although macroeconomics and trade theory are closely interre-
lated, the former typically takes patterns of trade and market structures as
given.
This paper develops a simple model of a closed economy to explore the
responses of intensive (volume) and extensive (range of varieties) margins to real
shocks. In so doing, it takes into account the fact that household welfare depends
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both on the quantity and diversity of consumption, i.e., a household prefers
to consume a bit of everything rather than a lot of one homogeneous good.
Krugman (1991), for example, has emphasized the role of product diversication
on welfare in the context of spatial economics.
I distinguish between two technologies in the economy. The rst determines
the capacity to invent new varieties. Firms compete with their di¤erentiated
varieties in a monopolistic market. They devote one period to designing a
variety and constructing a plant in which to produce it. Having done this,
they then produce and sell this variety in the following period. However, the
competition to o¤er new or improved varieties means that todays goods are
obsolete after just one year of production. As such, rms are obliged to use
their resources to invent new varieties every period. Thus, varieties should
not be considered as haute couture fashion items but rather as manufactured
goods that which need to be constantly adapted and improved. New models of
computers or cameras and the latest fashions for the forthcoming season are just
some examples of the butteryvarieties that make up long-lived goods. The
second technology determines methods of production. Both technologies are
homogeneous across rms and subject to external shocks. Here, a consideration
of the two technologies has a considerable bearing on the results as each of them
a¤ects real variables, albeit in distinct ways.
New Keynesian models combine a stripped-down Dixit-Stiglitz model of in-
dustrial structure with intertemporal optimizing behaviour and rational expec-
tations. They also generally impose a form of transitory nominal rigidity on
product prices and labour costs. The advantage of these models is their capac-
ity to combine these elements with a particular versatility for handling shocks
and associated policy challenges in seeking to achieve short-term stabilization.
One of their restrictions, however, is typically recognized as being the exog-
enization of the total number of rms. This is in contrast with the original
Dixit-Stiglitz paper (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977), where the number of rms is en-
dogenous and determined by a free entry-exit condition. This paper allows the
number of rms to vary over time and while this is not an entirely innovative
feature, few other papers conducted in the New Keynesian tradition do so. The
obvious exception here is the inter-country allocation of rms undertaken in the
Obstfeld-Rogo¤ papers (e.g. JPE 1995).
Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) explored these issues in the context of a
pure static model. Here, I adhere closely to their paper by introducing a quasi-
dynamic framework, in that I allow households to take intertemporal decisions,
although I focus my attention primarily on comparative statics. It is reasonable
to believe that the e¤ects of real shocks will di¤er when we account for the future
expectations of agents. Likewise, uncertainty may also play a crucial role in the
maximizing behaviour of agents. In order to capture this as simply as possible, I
introduce risk to rms via price rigidities. The introduction of nominal rigidities
enables me to reect on monetary policy and its optimal target.
As in Corsetti et al. (2007), drawing a distinction between two kinds of
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productivity (creation and production) is crucial. The former increases produc-
tion via the extensive margin and, as a consequence, enlarges the size of rms.
The latter has a negative impact on the number of varieties. A shock to the
size of the population increases the number of rms, in what is known as the
home market e¤ect in the open-economy literature, i.e., a country exports
the goods for which it o¤ers a relatively large local demand. The presence of
xed costs generates dependence between the number of rms and household
patience. When households are more patient, they save more. As a result, the
economy houses a larger number of acting rms. However, this cushions any
shock on the ability to create new varieties.
Moreover, nominal rigidities place the economy in a suboptimal point in
terms of welfare. In comparison with the exible-price scenario, prices rise
to higher levels and the number of rms falls. As such a result might justify
intervention, I explore here the role of a central bank. The monetary authority
is able to correct these imperfections by implementing a monetary policy that
is tied to the level of productivity in production. However, if the central bank
fails to choose the most appropriate monetary policy, this can destabilize the
economy. The consequences of this are discussed. Finally, although the paper
does not specically analyze the role of scal policy as a tool for addressing
market imperfections, a brief discussion is included in the section examining
price stickiness.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the
literature, while the sections that follow examine the possibilities of building
analytical tools in a closed- economic setting. Section 3 establishes the general
set-up for the basic model; Section 4 develops a exible-price version; Section
5 incorporates the rigidities in the prices chosen by the rms and examines the
impact of monetary policy and the problems generated by insu¢ cient stabiliza-
tion. Finally, Section 6 concludes. An appendix containing the algebraic details
is available upon request from the author.
2 Literature Review
Although there were a number of obvious forerunners, most notably Svensson
and van Wijnbergen (1989), it was Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1995) Redux model
that triggered a ood of research on a new class of open economy macroeconomic
models. This surge in the literature was characterised by a number of key distin-
guishing features: optimization-based dynamic general-equilibrium modelling;
stochastic shocks; imperfect competition; nominal rigidities and the evaluation
of monetary policies based explicitly on household welfare. This incorporation of
microeconomic optimization has permitted a rigorous welfare analysis of policies
and regimes, while the approach invites a rich analysis of alternative product,
labour, and asset-market structures, bringing research that much closer to the
complexities of reality.
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Imperfect competition is a key ingredient in these new models.1 Monopoly
power brings the equilibrium of production below that of the social optimum,
which is a distortion that can potentially be corrected by active monetary or s-
cal policy intervention. Both nominal rigidities and market imperfections alter
the transmission mechanism of shocks to real variables. By addressing issues
of concern to policymakers, this new strand of research seeks to provide an
analytical framework that is relevant for policy analysis. In fact, more recent
contributions have sought to understand more fully the positive macroeconomic
e¤ects of uncertainty, as well as the normative implications for alternative inter-
national monetary regimes. As Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) showed, important
e¤ects of uncertainty can compound or o¤set the more obvious welfare e¤ects
of variability, including e¤ects on economic activity levels.
For many decades now international trade has been growing faster than
GDP. For example, over the last thirty years, the share of imports in US GDP
has more than doubled: rising from 4.8 percent in 1972 to 11.5 percent in 2002,
while worldwide trade, measured as the value of trade as a fraction of the value
of GDP, increased from 7.9 percent in 1950 to 15.4 percent in 1990, a 94.9
percent increase (See Bergoeing and Kehoe (2001)). Most theorists claim that
this explosion in trade has its origin in three interrelated sources: the reduction
in trade costs, the relaxation of capital controls, and the relative growth of many
East Asian and other economies outside of the United States.
New trade theory provides insights for these stylized facts that are not so
readily explicable when adopting the traditional trade approach. Helpman and
Krugman (1987), for example, point out the need to introduce economies of
scale and imperfect competition in conventional trade models, like the Ricardian
model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, to explain these facts. However, this vast
body of new-trade theory literature often disregards the fact that US trade
jumped from a range of 74,667 imported varieties in 1972 to 259,215 in 2001.
Hence, the introduction of the endogenous entry and exit of rms may be a
crucial feature in capturing the real world evolution.
In the theoretical literature, while virtually all studies predict large economies
will export more in absolute terms than small economies, there is no agreement
on how this is brought about. Models that assume Armington (1969) national
di¤erentiation emphasize the intensivemargin, i.e., a country with double the
resources will trade twice as much but will not trade a greater number of goods.
Monopolistic competition models in the vein of Krugman (1980, 1981) stress
the extensivemargin for exports (i.e., economies twice the size will produce
and export twice as many goods). Hummels and Klenow (2002), for instance,
analyzed the exports in 1995 from 110 countries to 59 importers and decom-
posed the greater trade of larger economies into contributions from intensive
and extensive margins. Their main nding was that the extensive margin ac-
1Median elasticity of substitution has decreased over time. Thus, trade goods have be-
come increasingly more di¤erentiated. See Broda and Weinstein (2003). Furthermore, when
focusing on the increase in trade among industrialized countries, Markusen (1986) stressed
the unequal income elasticity of demands resulting from non-homothetic preferences: demand
for di¤erentiated products is superior to that for homogeneous products.
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counts for two-thirds of the greater exports of larger economies, and one-third of
the greater imports of larger economies. Similar results are obtained by Funke
and Ruhwedel (2001). However, Hummels and Klenow (2005) greatly extend
the results of previous studies regarding the relationship between the size of an
economy, international trade, and product variety, i.e., they shed considerable
light on the empirical aspects of the home market e¤ect.2
Luini and Mangani (2004) and Mangani (2007) report empirical analysis
using cross-sectional data of an extensive increase in trade. To do so, they
use an innovative source of data to estimate the variety of goods and services:
namely, registered trademarks (the Community and the International trade-
marks protected by the World Intellectual Property Organization). While the
use of trademarks potentially reduces the scope of the questions that can be
addressed, it enables them to carry out a broad analysis of product variety. The
main result to be derived from their research is that, by drawing on the afore-
mentioned data, they are able to verify the ndings of Hummels and Klenow
(2005) that larger economies (in terms of GDP) not only produce and export
more in absolute terms, but also produce and trade more goods. This implies
that the strong relationship between larger economies and product variety is
important as regards consumer welfare. However, the authors warn the reader
to be cautious in interpreting their ndings given the special characteristics of
their data.
From a theoretical perspective, however, the traditional literature has always
assumed that the number of rms is given or xed. This has prevented experts
from accurately determining the implications of di¤erent shocks on the range
of varieties available in di¤erent countries and, consequently, on national and
international welfare. Broda and Weinsteins (2003) empirical analysis o¤ers
an extensive discussion of the dramatic consequences this traditional set-up has
for research ndings. Notice that the import price index for models of this
kind (without endogenous variety) is one that does not take into account any
changes in the number of goods. Broda and Weinstein (2003), assuming that
Krugmans (1980) model ts US data, show the mismeasurement caused by the
use of an incorrect price index. They conclude that US welfare increased by
2.83 percent solely as a result of the expansion in varieties (from 1990-2001).
These gains from variety are three to six times larger than the estimated gains
from eliminating protectionism (e.g., Feenstra et al. (1992) and Romer (1994))
and around ten times larger than the estimated gains from eliminating business
cycles (Alvarez and Jermann (2004)).
A number of new open-economists (including Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
and Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007)) have recently begun to take this es-
sential characteristic into account. In this way, they are able to consider the
relationship between the macroeconomic e¤ects of the productivity di¤erential
and the substitutability or complementarity of goods, i.e., showing that elas-
2 In fact, they found that countries with more workers export greater quantities to each
market-category, but at prices that are no lower. This is consistent with a model in which
larger countries avoid terms of trade deterioration by enlarging the set and/or increasing the
quality of the goods they produce.
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ticities matter when determining levels of production and allocations. Ghironi
and Melitzs (2005) research is, as such, most closely in line with the analysis
reported here of an open-economy scenario. Their approach di¤ers from that
adopted by Corsetti et al. (2007) in three main ways: a) they endogenize the
tradability of goods instead of the creation of new varieties; b) they allow for
heterogeneity of rms and, thus, are able to observe idiosyncratic shocks; and
c) they incorporate dynamics on the understanding that rms must pay a sunk
entry cost to start production.
This paper undertakes a closed-economy analysis with homogeneous rms.
The model adopted incorporates dynamics a là Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
observes shocks to labour and innovation productivities. The objective is to
understand the consequences of market structure dynamics within a countrys
borders.
3 The Model
I model an autarchy where external trade in goods or assets is not possible. The
economy consists of Lt innitely-lived households, an endogenously determined
number of varieties, and a government. The only source of investment is that
involved in the start-up cost for each new variety produced by a monopolistic
rm.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by Lt innitely-lived households whose utility func-
tion is
Et
X
U = E
1X
t=0
t
24C1  1 t
1  1 
  k`t
35 ; (1)
where C is the index of consumption dened below, ` is the labour supply which
generates a constant disutility measured by k,  is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and  is the subjective discount factor.
Households can be employed either in the creation and design of new va-
rieties that will be supplied in the next period or in the production tasks of
currently active rms. However, they are homogeneous and receive the same
wage regardless of their occupation in the economy.
The index of consumption takes the usual form
Ct =

ntR
h=0
ct(h)
1  1 dh
 
 1
; (2)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, nt is the number
of varieties available for consumption in period t and ct (h) is the individual
demand of variety h. Household preferences are assumed to be expressed for a
6
very large set of goods, so that their utility is well dened (and increasing) for
any new good introduced in the market, and for a given level of technology and
labour endowment.
Consumers are restricted by their budget identity,
stIt +Bt = st 1
ntZ
h=0
t(h)dh+ (1 + it)Bt 1 +wt`t  
ntZ
h=0
pt(h)ct(h)dh  Tt; (3)
where s are savings expressed as a proportion of total investment, B are riskless
bonds and (h) are the prots generated by rm h. There are n monopolistic
rms producing di¤erentiated varieties, i is the nominal interest rate paid by
the bonds, w represents the wage, p(h) is the price for variety h, and T is a
lump-sum tax paid each period. Finally, It denotes total investment, which is
equal to
It =
24 nt+1Z
h=0
qt(h)dh
35 = qtnt+1; (4)
where q(h) is the cost incurred by a rm in order to create a new variety today
that can be brought to the market tomorrow. So that, st = 1Lt due to the
homogeneity among households.
By deciding how much to invest, households indirectly a¤ect the amount of
labour devoted to the creation of new equipment for the production of new or
improved varieties in the next period. This amount of labour e¤ort is, hence,
prevented from participating in the production of todays consumption goods.
3.2 Firms
A continuum of nt monopolistic rms acts in the economy at t. Investment
appears in the form of an exogenous start-up cost, qt, that entrepreneurs need
to incur, at time t, in order to develop their new variety. These varieties are
produced and sold in the market at t + 1. This cost comprises the wages paid
to the labour force allocated to the innovation tasks that have productivity
t. So that qt = 1vt . It is arguably more natural to assume that the design of
a new variety requires some nal goods that would otherwise have been used
as consumption. Indeed, the use of part of the available homogeneous labour
supply for creation, rather than for the production of consumption goods, is
equivalent to this.
Investment is fully depreciated at the end of the productive period. As such,
these two-period rms could be said to adhere to the reinvent yourself or die
rule. Any rm wishing to survive in the market must necessarily incur constant
costs of innovation. Successful rms, therefore, produce a renewed variety of
their good and, in this model, they are considered new rms/varieties in
the following period. Unsuccessful rms, by contrast, disappear and new rms
enter the market during each period. The model does not, however, di¤erentiate
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between old-renewed and brand-new rms. Simply it provides us with the total
number of varieties supplied in the market during each period, which is the
measure that in essence a¤ects welfare.
Once set up, the rms produce a di¤erentiated variety with a homogeneous
and linear technology that requires only labour
yt(h) = t`t(h); (5)
where y(h) is the production of variety h,  is the productivity parameter,
which is completely exogenous and `(h) is the amount of labour required for
productive activities of variety h.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 The Flexible Price Regime
Let us rst focus on an environment without nominal frictions. In this case, all
contracts and prices are written in nominal terms and are completely exible.
Hence, we can solve for the real variables only and resort to a cashless economy.
4.1.1 The Households Problem
The representative household makes decisions regarding consumption, labour
supply and savings. To do so, it maximizes (1) subject to (3), which produces
the following rst-order conditions:
ct(h) : c (h) =

pt(h)
Pt
 
Ct; (6)
Ct : t =
1
PtC
1
 
t
; (7)
`t : w = kPtC
1
 
t ;
st : tqtnt+1 = Et [t+1t+1nt+1] ; (8)
Bt : t =  (1 + it)Ett+1; (9)
where P is the welfare-based price index and  is the Lagrangian operator.
Observe that the rst-order condition for st implies free entry in the goods
market. This condition provides us with a result for nt+1: It also informs us that
new rms will be set up until the expected discounted prots of the marginal
rm (i.e., the present value of the rm) are equal to the costs of creating it. By
using the denition
t = PtC
1
 
t ; (10)
the free entry condition can be rewritten as follows:
qt = Et
t
t+1
t+1; (11)
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where  must be interpreted as the monetary policy.
As for portfolio choice, there is no borrowing or lending in the equilibrium, so
that Bt = 0 8t . Moreover, each homogeneous household has an equal share of
equities, st = 1Lt . However, notice that in the case in which we allow for popula-
tion growth, it has to be controlled for. The equal-share result can be retained
by introducing a redistributive scheme with lump-sum taxes and transfers so
that the government budget becomes
T +
Z 1
a=0
Ta =
nZ
G(h); (12)
where G (h) is public consumption of variety h and Ta is a positive transfer for
the generations already working and a negative transfer for the new generation
that owns no shares in the rms. This transfer program is self-nanced, so thatZ 1
a=0
Ta = 0 . The subscript a refers to the age of the individual.
In this context, the welfare-based price index is
Pt = n
1
1 
t pt; (13)
which is decreasing in the number of varieties. Finally, for the sake of simplicity
we assume that the governments public demand is similar to the private demand
derived in (6) for each specic variety. Hence,
Gt (h) =

pt(h)
Pt
 
Gt; (14)
where Gt is total public expenditure.
4.1.2 The FirmsProblem
The productively homogeneous rms operating in this economy produce di¤er-
entiated goods. They enjoy some monopolistic power and maximize their prots
with respect to price and labour and subject to the technology constraint. Prof-
its are a function of nt+1 via the expression for the consumer price index (CPI).
That is,
t+1 =
1

p1 t+1 (h)Lt+1
 
t+1
n
  
1 
t+1
+
1

pt+1(h)Gt+1 (h) : (15)
The sign of the e¤ects of the number of acting rms on prots depends on
the level of substitutability or market power, determined by  and the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution  . In general, prots are not as high in markets
in which competition is stronger. In equation (15) this condition holds for
  
1  > 0 . I assume '  1 <  . Indeed, the literature typically parameterises
1=2 > ' > 1 . The most appropriate choice for  is less obvious, although it is
typically set above 1 and values between 2 and 10 are common.
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Under perfect foresight, nt+1 is the solution to the free entry condition:
qt = 
t
t+1
24 1

p1 t+1 (h)Lt+1
 
t+1
n
  
1 
t+1
+
1

pt+1(h)Gt+1 (h)
35 ; (16)
where pt is the optimal price obtained from the rst-order conditions in the
maximization problem. This takes the usual form of a constant mark-up over
the marginal cost of production,
pt =

   1
kt
t
: (17)
The number of varieties supplied in the market is determined by the combina-
tion of the last two equations and the households rst-order conditions. This
depends on the exogenous technology processes, the size of the population, scal
policy and some parameters,
nt+1 =
264 kt    1 1 kt+1Gt+1 (h)
 1
h

 1
k

t+1
i1  
Lt+1
375
 1
  
: (18)
The relationship between the number of active rms and the cost of creation lies
in this equality.  >  is needed in order to ensure a decreasing e¤ect of entry
costs on the number of available varieties. This condition is required because
an increase in the number of rms (which crucially would change expected
prots) generates two e¤ects on the consumption demand. First, the CPI falls,
resulting in intertemporal substitution, represented by  , that consists in higher
consumption today. Second, since there are more goods to consume, households
split their income between them. This reallocation of private expenditure among
all goods generates an intratemporal substitution away from existing goods,
which is measured by . Notice that, in line with this reasoning, the inequality
( >  ) becomes a necessary condition for the steady state equilibrium to be
stable.
Due to the existence of in-advance investment, the subjective discount factor,
, a¤ects the number of rms positively. When people are more patient they
choose to save more and buy shares in the rm. In this way, an economy is
supplied with a larger range of varieties. Obviously, the cost of creating new
rms reduces the number of companies acting in the next period.
It is perhaps important at this juncture to stress the various implications
of a change in the number of rms. First, consider that consumers have a love
of variety. This means they prefer to consume a larger range of di¤erent goods
rather than a large amount of just a few goods.3 So, in principle, they should
3There is a body of literature that deals with this consideration and which explicitly sep-
arates the love of variety from the elasticity of substitution. See, for example De Groot and
Nahuis (1998) and De Groot (2001).
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be better o¤with more rms in the market. However, a greater number of rms
means that more labour will be used in non-production activities. Each new
company incurs a prior xed cost which requires labour. And as this new com-
pany will not supply a new good until the second period, the workers employed
to innovate during the rst period are kept away from the production of goods
already available for consumption. This is a traditional trade-o¤. Households
must renounce present consumption in order to invest (with the xed cost) in
innovation and enjoy consumption tomorrow.4
Hence, decisions regarding savings that are dedicated to innovation ulti-
mately determine the size of a rm that I call Z.
Zt =
Lt`t   nt+1vt
nt
(19)
=
LtCt(t) +Gt(t)
tnt
;
where ntZt is the number of workers not employed in the creation of new rms
at t; so that, it is the labour force available for the production of nal goods
today. Equation (19) represents the size of a rm producing at t: It indicates
that an increment in the overall number of currently active rms, ceteris paribus,
reduces the number of workers in each one as the larger number of rms must
share the same number of workers. An increase in expected prots or a reduction
in the costs of creation makes innovation more attractive and nt+1 higher. .
Consequently, the labour force for the production of nal goods is lost today
in order to reach the new level of n. This causes a reduction in Zt. Finally, if
people experience a larger disutility for their labour e¤ort and decide to increase
their leisure time, either production per variety must be reduced or people must
renounce future varieties. The second part of equation (19) shows that Z is
a function of the GDP. However, it is not possible to analyze variations in Z
because of the two simultaneous e¤ects an increase on t generates. For a given
demand, an increase in labour productivity, t, would generate a reduction on
rms size due to the fact that less labour is required to produce the same amount
of goods. Since n is given from previous period, the unique instantaneous e¤ect
of t improvement is via the reduction of the price index, which results in an
increase in the demand that completely o¤sets the rst impact of a movement
in t.
4.2 Market Dynamics
If we di¤erentiate the equilibrium condition (16) in the steady state dened
above, take the assumption made in (14) and set public expenditure to zero
4A further consideration might be the existence of scale economies. In this case, the
opportunity cost of enjoying a new variety would be much more important in the case of scale
ine¢ ciencies. But this analysis lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
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(G = 0), then the result is the following equation in di¤erences:
    
   1
dnt+1
n
=
dt

+ (   1) dt+1 + dLt+1 + k


   1
 
n
 
1  dGt+1: (20)
Notice, rst of all, that the sign of the e¤ects crucially depends on the relation
between  and  . Under the initial assumption,   1 <  , if there is an
increase in the e¢ ciency with which rms are created, i.e., as vt rises, the number
of rms also increases. By contrast, when rms become more productive, i.e.,
each rm is able to supply a larger amount of variety h with the same quantity
of inputs (), this productivity improvement discourages the creation of new
rms. The reason for this is that a lower marginal cost forces rms to set prices
accordingly, which is translated into smaller prots when the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is below 1 (i.e.,  < 1 ).
Notice also the consequences of an overall productivity change, i.e., d = dv .
Although these two shocks act in opposite directions, in the static model the
dominant e¤ect is unambiguously the positive impact of extra e¢ ciency on the
creation of new rms. The only exception is  = 0 . In this case, one of the
shocks balances the other exactly. However, under the present framework, this
is not so clear. The relationship between the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion  and the patience of the households  determines whether the total e¤ect
results in the entry or exit of rms. Based on the assumption  < 1 and assum-
ing 0 <   1 , the dominant e¤ect is, as in the static case, the improvement in
v. In fact, this positive impact becomes stronger as  falls (8 < 1) . Hence, the
greater the patience shown by the consumers, the smaller is the positive impact
of a shock on the productivity of creation. The intuition behind this result is the
following: on the one hand, when people are patient, they tend to invest more
and so, in general, the economy produces a wider range of varieties than it does
when consumers are impatient (notice that the derivative of (16) with respect
to  is unambiguously positive). On the other hand, when consumers tend to
save more, the demand for each variety falls and, so, the expected prots also
fall. This serves as a disincentive to new market entrants. However, if  < 1
does not hold, the nal result is uncertain.
Additionally, a larger market size, i.e., larger L, generates an increase in the
number of rms.5 More public expenditure means more total demand, which
also leads to a greater range of varieties. Indeed, the scal authority has some
scope for taking actions to restrict monopolistic power. Thus, it might o¤er a
per unit subsidy to ensure that rms price at, and not above, their marginal
costs. This scal expenditure can be recouped from lump-sum taxes so as to
avoid generating a new distortion. This, today, is a recurrent theme in both
modern industrial organization literature and advanced textbooks and so I do
not tackle it any further here.
Finally, notice that the monetary stance  is absent from the above equation,
since monetary policy cannot have any impact on real variables when prices are
completely exible.
5Recall that I control for growth in L with redistributive transfers.
12
To sum up, while most of the conclusions concerning the e¤ects of the en-
dogenous variables on the number of varieties may be quite obvious to the
reader, the crucial role of the explicit di¤erence drawn between the two types
of productivity should be borne in mind.
4.3 Consumer Price Index
As discussed above, household utility is derived from consumption; however,
the household is concerned about both the quantity and variety of its consumer
basket. Having analyzed the factors that can a¤ect the diversity of goods in the
market, let us turn to examine how household purchasing power is a¤ected by
prices. The di¤erentiation of equation (13), the welfare-based CPI, results in
the following expression:
dPt
P
=
1
1  
dnt
n
+ dt   dt: (21)
If we once again assume  > 1 , the more rms that act in the market, the
lower the price index P will fall. That is, as the number of rms in the market
increases, competition becomes ercer, pushing prices down. Likewise, P will
fall more rapidly, as the substitutability between varieties increases, i.e., as the
monopolistic power of the rms is weakened. An improvement in productivity
also reduces the CPI, since production costs are lower. The implications of this
have been widely studied in open economy models as it means that countries
with better technology (i.e., more developed countries) experience deteriorating
terms of trade (dened as the ratio between import and export prices). Finally,
consideration needs to be given to the e¤ects of the monetary policy, which, as
expected, are positive.
4.4 Steady State Analysis
In order to dene a steady state, let  = 1 ,  =  = 1 , L = 1 . Thus, w = k
and
k = 
1

"

   1k
1  
1
n
  
1 
+


   1k

G (h)
#
: (22)
Moreover, if I set G = 0; then
n =
"

1
k


   1k
1  #  1  
: (23)
In the steady state, when rms are able to charge a high mark-up, entry is
more attractive as they can expect higher prots. Given that investment is
being made, in the form of the operating costs paid in advance, the subjective
discount factor a¤ects the number of varieties in equilibrium. The impact will
be either positive or negative depending, again, on the relationship between 
and  . If  >  (i.e., goods are complements in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense),
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an increase in household patience leads to a reduction in the number of rms
in equilibrium. However, if  <  (i.e., goods are substitutes), as assumed
here, the greater the degree of household patience, the more likely people are
to choose to save by investing in a rms shares. This results in an increase in
the number of varieties in equilibrium. By contrast, as the disutility of labour
e¤ort increases (k), consumers attach relatively more value to leisure than to
consumption. Hence, the number of varieties is reduced as the labour supply
decreases.
From equations (9) and (8) and the assumptions made for the steady state
equilibrium, we nd that
 =
1
1 + i
: (24)
For the rest of the endogenous variables we nd:
p =

   1k; (25)
P =

k

 1
  

k
   1
  1
  
: (26)
In the steady state, individual prices depend positively on the monopolistic
power of rms and their marginal costs, measured by k = w . The price index
value is subject to the size of the mark-up and the level of patience of the house-
holds. The impact on the CPI of variations in these concepts di¤ers depending
on whether the goods are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes,
a high level of patience reduces the price index. In this case, people work to
generate more di¤erentiated varieties, which is to the detriment of P .
Consumption in equilibrium is
c =
1

(   1) ; (27)
C = 
 
  (   1) ( 1)  (k)    : (28)
Consumption per variety is a¤ected only by patience and the elasticity of sub-
stitution. From (23) it is known that the elasticity of substitution has a negative
relationship with the number of rms in equilibrium (when goods are substi-
tutes). As varieties become more substitutable, people are more reluctant to
work towards creating new rms so as to simply achieve more of the same after
paying the xed cost. Hence, they decide to invest less and consume a larger
amount of each (already) available variety. For this reason,  has a positive
e¤ect on c. The e¤ects of the parameters on C present exactly the opposite sign
to those for CPI.
Finally,
Y = C; (29)
 =
k

per rm. (30)
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The rst identity is a straightforward result of a closed economy without govern-
ment consumption. Notice the extremely simplied form found for prots. As
households su¤er more from their labour e¤ort, they will renounce the creation
of more rms and so prots per rm will increase. By contrast, if the patience
levels of consumers are high, present consumption will present a lower value,
savings will be higher and the economy will be able to support more produc-
ers in equilibrium. However, such an outcome reduces protability per rm.
Finally, the last steady state equation is indicative of the level of labour supply.
` = C + n =


   1k
  
n
 
 1 + n; (31)
= 
 
  (   1) ( 1)  (k)    +


k
  1
  


   1k
(1  )  1  
:(32)
As the population becomes more patient, the labour supply obviously under-
goes an increment owing to the increase in n. Furthermore, an increase in the
disutility of work reduces the labour supply. For values of  larger than one,
but which do not rise very high, labour supply decreases with substitutability.
This is probably because of the decrease in the number of rms (fewer start-
ups). However, if  becomes very large, the labour supply of each individual is
reduced. The reason for this is that, at this point, the positive e¤ect of  on c
per variety - which increases total demand and hence, production - dominates
the negative e¤ect of the reduction in the number of rms.
4.5 Analysis of the Macro-Dynamics
Let us log-linearize all the relevant equations: rst-order conditions, budget
constraints and any equilibrium conditions for studying the models dynamics.
There are fourteen unknowns, i.e. endogenous variables: P , p, n, C, c, s, B,
G(h), `, i, w, Y , I and , and fourteen linearized equations.6 This system can
be reduce to the following rearranged expression for the free entry condition:
1
 
  1


nk
$
n^t+2 =  v^t   P^t+1 + L^t+1   n^t+1   (33)
 

1

  1
 

k
$

 n

L^t   ^t+1 + nv^t+1

;
where $ > 0,  > 0;  > 0 for 0 <  and  < 0.7
Equation (33) is a rst-order di¤erence equation that depends on the en-
dogenous variables n and P , the exogenous variables v,  and L and on the
constant parameters contained also in $, ,  and .
Notice that, when the CPI deviates above its steady state value, it has a
positive impact on the future number of rms. This is because higher prices are
6See the appendix for details.
7See the appendix for details of these parameter aggregates.
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transformed in higher prots. Hence, rms will take advantage of this deviation
and enter the market. Moreover, consumption becomes relatively expensive
with respect to investment. People expect that P will return to its steady
state value in the long term, so they prefer to wait for consumption. If nt+1
deviates from n (above), at t+ 2 the economy tends to correct that deviation by
reducing the number of rms. The e¤ects of v and L are also worth observing.
Both exogenous variables appear in two lagged periods (t and t+ 1 ) and their
e¤ects work in opposite directions. An improvement in vt increases nt+1, but
by a smaller proportion.8 Hence, at t+ 1 there is already a high range of
varieties available, i.e. in deviations, n is at a higher level than that of the
steady state value. Here again, the negative e¤ect on n^t+2 is the correction of
this "excessive" value. L^t is derived from the substitution of C^t+1 in the budget
constraint: Therefore, the impact is generated by the deviations of C. If the
population was low during the last period, then people can expect to receive a
larger proportion of the total prots generated by existing rms today. Hence,
households can consume more. This higher demand acts as an incentive to
businessmen and the number of rms created at t+ 1 rises. So, the deviation
in t+ 1 is corrected in t+ 2 .
To analyze the dynamic behaviour of the main variables, it is useful to
organize the system so as to obtain a rst-order di¤erence equation. Notice
that the unique endogenous variable with two-periods lag is the exogenous v^t.9
kn
$
n^t+2 ' #nn^t+1 + L^t+1   kn
$
L^t +
kn
$
v^t+1 +


   1 v^t + #^t+1:
10 (34)
For the accepted standard values of ,  ,  and k in the macro literature,11 the
intertemporal e¤ects on n are the following: #n > 0 , i.e., positive deviations
of n in t, increase the number of rms in the next period. The number of
varieties in the market helps reduce the CPI, hence it is cheaper to consume and
households agree to save more to create new rms. Variations in the size of the
population have a longer term impact. First, since  > 0 , a larger population
today provides more than one-to-one incentives for the creation of rms in the
next period, since there is more labour available and expected prots are higher
because of the extra demand. By contrast, L^t has a negative e¤ect that is
lower than one on n^t+2, which helps correct the excess creation of rms. 
 < 0
and $ > 0 , so, as explained above, we nd that once again the change in this
8Bear in mind that nt+1 is decided at t, which is why the relevant productivity of creation
is vt
9A further (numerical) analysis would require a study of the roots, considering L and  as
parameters of the characteristic polynomial, which would therefore depend on time. Here I
adhere to a simple reasoning of the coe¢ cients of the variables.
11The standard macroeconomic literature usually sets  , the risk aversion parameter, around
or below 0.5, so that 1
 
' 2 (see for instance, Greenwood, Hercovitz and Hu¤man (1988),
Mendoza (1991) and Blankenau, Kose and Yi (2001)). The disutility of labor, k, in a linear
technology is around 0:75. It is set in such a way that labour force participation matches the
value of 66% reported by the BLS and the ILO (see, for example, Poschke (2009).  is close
to 1 and  > 1 (see Kollmann (2006)). The signs of the coe¢ cients in the equation are stable
for a large range of values above and below the standard values.
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variable has opposite intertemporal e¤ects. Finally # > 0 for  is extremely
close to one and negative otherwise. A positive deviation in the productivity
of production today will result in more varieties tomorrow, if the population is
patient. If not, then households will tend to consume more, since they expect
to benet, both in the current and in the following periods, from levels of 
over its steady state, so they over-consume and the number of varieties at t+ 1
decreases.
5 Nominal Rigidities in Prices
The recent literature on macroeconomics and trade has often been concerned
with nominal rigidities, seeing them as a possible, albeit partial, explanation for
some of the more abstruse questions currently being addressed by the experts
(the so called economic puzzles). In this section, I develop a version of the basic
model which introduces rigidities in the prices of the varieties.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2007) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) argue that sticky
wages and exible prices are a close reection of reality. Yet despite this claim, if
prices are set as a constant mark-up over marginal costs, then for certain appli-
cations it would not matter whether or not prices and wages were sticky.12 The
introduction of nominal rigidities means monetary policies can be analysed and
the monetary authorities have the capacity to handle the distortions generated
by such goods market frictions.
Although it lies beyond the scope of this paper, we cannot disregard com-
pletely the role of scal policies in the correction of the market imperfections
that arise in this model: namely, those of monopolistic power and price sticki-
ness. Indeed, modern advanced textbooks on Industrial Organization and the
creative-destruction models of Aghion and Howitt discuss these issues at length.
A benevolent planner may give a per unit subsidy to rms to ensure they price
at, and not above, their marginal cost. To address the optimality of the exten-
sive margin (i.e., the number of varieties supplied to the market) from societys
point of view, the government may apply a subsidy or a tax on the xed costs.
In fact, markets with monopolistic competition may su¤er from either too many
or too few varieties. An increase in competition does not always result in a rise
in welfare because it generates two opposite externalities. On the one hand,
each new rm obtains its prots by depriving their competitors of some of their
previous prots, i.e., a business-stealing e¤ect. On the other hand, it raises
consumer surplus. When rms have no xed costs, the latter are always higher.
However, when set-up costs are required, there is no guarantee that more rms
will automatically generate more welfare (see Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for
a detailed discussion).
What then is the role of the monetary authority in the context of our closed
economy? Firms can no longer exibly alter their prices in the face of a shock.
12Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), however, provide an example of when it would matter
- in a closed economy with both staggered price- and staggered wage-setting, the monetary
authority can no longer replicate the exible price equilibrium.
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Rather, at the beginning of each period, they must sign contracts setting nomi-
nal prices for that period based on their expectations.13 Prices crucially depend
on expected . An expected monetary expansion raises the price level and
nominal spending.
The government controls the path of short-term rates i, providing a nominal
anchor for market expectations. A forward-looking monetary measure,  is
provided by equation (9) and the denition in (10). So that,
1
t
=  (1 + it)Et
1
t+1
;
where
t+1
t
represents the (gross) ination target in a non-stochastic steady
state.
5.1 FirmsProblem
Firms maximize their expected prots with respect to labour, `, and the price,
p. So that,
Max
`; p
Et

Q

pt+1 (Lt+1ct+1(h) +Gt+1(h))  wt+1
t+1
(Lt+1ct+1(h) +Gt+1(h))

;
where Q is the discount factor. Thus, the rst-order conditions yield the follow-
ing expression for the optimal price of the di¤erentiated variety:
pt+1 =

   1
Et

k
t+1
 t+1

Et

  1t+1
 : (35)
Considering the optimal choice of prices and assuming that public expenditure
is zero, the free entry condition (FEC) becomes
k
vt
= Et

pt+1
t+1
  k
t+1

Lt+1ct+1(h): (36)
13Today, a number nt+1 of rms (matching condition 11) has been created. These rms
will start producing tomorrow only if the price they have xed in the previous period is at
least as high as their marginal cost, i.e.,
pt  MCt = 
   1
kPtC
1
 
t
t
  wt
t
 0
= >
k
   1PtC
1
 
t  wt:
In what follows, we need not concern ourselves with this condition as it is never violated under
this current framework.
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Equation (36) provides us with the number of varieties exchanged in the con-
sumer goods market at time t+ 1 when prices are rigid, nr;t+1. This is
n
  
 1
r;t+1 =
vt
k
Lt+1


   1
  
k1   (37)
Et
26666666664
  1t+1

 1
0B@Et
 

 
t+1
t+1
!
Et(  1t+1 )
1CA
1  
 
 
 
t+1
t+1
0B@Et
 

 
t+1
t+1
!
Et(  1t+1 )
1CA
  
37777777775
:
Hence, households consume
cr;t (h) = n
  
1 
t
0BBBB@ t

 1
kEt 1


 
t
t

Et 1(  1t )
1CCCCA
 
(38)
of each variety when prices are rigid. In this scenario, the real variables nt and ct
are tied to the expected behaviour of the monetary authorities and the expected
shocks to productivity of processes of production. Thus, the credibility of the
government becomes a relevant factor.
5.2 The monetary policy
Economic policies may seek to stabilize economic cycles and so correct market
imperfections. This paper restricts itself to comparative statics, so that this
section examines the capability of monetary policy to solve the imperfection
generated by nominal stickiness. Here a government can aim to close the out-
put gap and replicate the exible-price situation. The exible-price scenario
is better in terms of welfare given that it has only to su¤er the monopolistic
power imperfection. The monetary authority should commit itself to a mon-
etary policy , whereby the number of rms in the case of rigidities, nr;t+1,
equals the number of rms in the exible-price situation, nf;t+1. Once again,
the authorities may have to deal with an important trade-o¤: it may not be true
that by simply closing the output gap the economy will simultaneously attain
the consumption of the exible set-up. In other words, although the output gap
might be narrowed, the consumption gap could well remain.
To achieve the same number of rms as in the exible-price scenario, the
monetary authority would need to set a monetary policy  = , taking the
CPI as given. This policy rule involves committing itself to providing a nominal
anchor for the economy and deviating from such a stance only when productivity
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shocks shake the economy and destabilize marginal costs. By so doing, the policy
eliminates uncertainty in marginal costs and in prots.
Let us verify the implications of this monetary policy on output. After
plugging the optimal policy in (37), nr;t+1 becomes exactly equal to nf;t+1:
n
  
 1
r;t+1 =
vt
k
Lt+1


   1
  
1
   1

k1  Et
h
  1t+1
i
= (39)
=
"
t
k
k1  Lt+1
1
   1


   1
  
1

t+1
1  #
= n
 1
  
f;t+1:
Notice that the authority is able to x both the output and consumption levels
of the exible-prices regime by using the dened policy. Consumption, (38),
becomes cr;t (h) = n
  
1 
t

k
 1
  
 t , which is the same as it was in the exible
version. Moreover, in the steady state,
nr =

 (k)
  
(   1)  1
  1
  :
5.2.1 The Costs of Insu¢ cient Stabilization
Although benevolent, the monetary authority may fail to choose the correct
policy. What, therefore, would be the consequences of adopting a sub-optimal
monetary policy? Logically, we can predict that welfare would be damaged
by such macroeconomic uncertainty, since insu¢ cient stabilization results in
suboptimal prices and a suboptimal number of varieties.
Let us assume that the authority incorrectly sets a monetary policy  =  
where 0     1 (  = 1 would be the suitable policy for a exible-price repli-
cation). For any value of   di¤erent from one, the policy response to shocks will
be ine¢ cient in relation to the governments target. Thus, now
pt+1 =
k
   1
Et

   1t+1

Et


 (  1)
t+1
 :
Applying Jensens inequality, it is known that Et

   1t+1

 Et (t+1)   1
and
Et


 (  1)
t+1

 Et (t+1) (  1) . Without any loss of generality, I choose
  = 0 and verify the e¤ect of insu¢ cient stabilization. The consequence is
undoubtedly higher prices:
p =
k
   1Et

1


>
k
   1 : (40)
Uncertainty about marginal costs tends to reduce expected discounted prots.
This is because people are risk averse and prefer a certain amount of income x
rather than an expected average income of x. In order to make discounted prots
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less sensitive to shocks, rms raise their preset prices. In this way, the economy
su¤ers higher price levels14 and, consequently, lower levels of consumption.
Moreover, if the government tends to adopt monetary policies that do not
completely o¤set the productivity shock, investors, who are risk averse, will tend
to feel uncertain about their future prots and so create fewer rms:
n
  
 1
r;t+1
 
 =  
  n   1r;t+1 ( = ) =



   1Et


 (  1)
t+1

  Et

   1t+1

  


   1Et


(  1)
t+1

  Et

  1t+1

=

   1
24Et  (  1)t+1   Et (  1)t+1 
( )
35+
24Et   1t+1   Et    1t+1 
( )
35 ;
where  = vtk Lt+1


 1
  
k1  . To sum up, when monetary authorities
fail to use the replication policy,15 the economy is characterised by prices that
are too high and a number of varieties that is too low. Moreover, the surplus
of consumers is seriously damaged in both it dimensions: rst, the level of
consumption is a¤ected by reduced purchasing power, and, second, there is
very little variety of di¤erentiated goods, i.e., people are unable to satisfy their
love of variety.
As discussed above, as regards its scal policy, the government could inter-
vene to remove the imperfections of monopoly power. For instance, it could use
a subsidy to reduce the marginal costs of production.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a dynamic general-equilibrium model of a closed econ-
omy and has analysed full price exibility and the simplest case of nominal price
rigidities. The paper shows the relevance of intertemporal decisions and uncer-
tainty in determining the level of economic activity. Thus, on the one hand, a
change in the degree of patience manifest by the consumer moves the economy
to a steady state, so that the greater the consumers patience, the greater the
product diversity enjoyed by that society. On the other hand, when a society
faces nominal rigidities, rms tend to set higher prices to (partially) o¤set the
losses they can expect to su¤er in the case of a negative shock to productivity (of
production). At the same time, managers tend to create fewer rms as prots
are no longer certain.
The di¤erent types of productivity shock have e¤ects of opposite signs on
the extensive margin of production: an improvement to the technology of cre-
ation increases the number of varieties, while an increase in the productivity of
14This result coincides with the conclusion reached in related studies. See, for instance,
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
15 In other words, the monetary policy that matches the solution in a exible-price frame-
work.
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operational rms reduces the number of goods supplied. Finally, an increase in
market size has a positive impact on the number of varieties.
In the present paper, as in most of the literature, the elasticity of substitution
between goods and the love of variety are perfectly tied together (in the set-up
presented here, love of variety equals the rmsmark-up). It may, however, be
of interest to relax this assumption and to consider their explicit separation. De
Groot and Nahuis (1998) claim that the disentanglement of the two elasticities
might have important implications for economic growth and welfare.
Finally, it is worth stressing the current dearth of empirical research. Es-
tablishing a separation between the two kinds of productivity empirically is by
no means a straightforward task, and while Debaere and Lee (2004) report an
initial attempt at identifying them separately, there remains much work to be
done.
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